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ABSTRACT
The present article endeavors to put the old question of the ‘force of words’ 
into a pragmatic perspective, especially insofar as the law and legal texts 
are concerned.  Questioning the wisdom of the old adage “Saying it don’t 
make it so”, I show that words do have an effect (which philosophers 
and linguists have tried to capture, using the concepts of ‘speech act’ or 
‘pragmatic act’), and that the legal constituents of this ‘force’ are precisely 
what makes contractual acts valid. Here, too, words sometimes may be 
omitted, or substituted by actions, provided the context allows for it. Based 
on a few historical and contemporary cases, the article demonstrates 
furthermore how words indeed make a difference in a variety of legal and 
other societal contexts. The pragmatic (that is, user-oriented) angle is 
always paramount, and our words should obey the pragmatic conditions, 
often called ‘affordances’, of the situation in which they are being uttered.
Keywords: speech (pragmatic) acts, legal norms, contracts, sequentiality
RESUMO
O presente artigo busca colocar a velha questão da ‘força das palavras’ 
em uma perspectiva pragmática, especialmente na medida em que a lei 
e os textos legais são colocados em questão. Ao se questionar a sabedoria 
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do velho ditado “Dizer não é fazer”, mostro que as palavras realmente têm 
um efeito (o que os filósofos e linguistas têm tentado entender, utilizando 
os conceitos de ‘ato de fala’ ou ‘ato pragmatico’), e que os constituintes 
legais desta ‘força’ são precisamente o que faz com que os atos contratuais 
sejam válidos. Aqui, também, as palavras às vezes podem ser omitidas, ou 
substituídas por ações, desde que o contexto o permita. Baseado em alguns 
casos históricos e contemporâneos, o artigo sugere, além disso, como as 
palavras de fato podem fazer a diferença em uma variedade de contextos: 
sociais, legais e outros. O ângulo pragmático (isto é, a orientação para 
o utilizador) é sempre primordial, e as nossas palavras devem obedecer 
às condições pragmáticas, muitas vezes chamadas de ‘affordances’, da 
situação em que elas estão sendo proferidas.
Palavras-chave: atos de fala (pragmáticos), normas legais, contratos, 
sequencialidade
Introduction: ‘Saying it don’t make it so’–or does it?
One often hears it said: “Saying it don’t make it so”—and the 
meaning of the saying is that in situations where things have to be 
decided on, done, planned, executed, and so on, certain people are 
prone to engage in lengthy diatribes about what should be done, rather 
than doing something in order to realize the plans. In such a situation, 
the other participants in the planning may be tempted to shut up the 
talker by remarking that no matter how much s/he discourses on the 
subject, nothing will happen until s/he does something about it, for 
indeed, ‘saying it don’t make it so’. Similarly, when people are trying to 
make the computer behave by writing a program, the received wisdom 
has it that talking about it in terms of what could be done or should be 
done doesn’t amount to the practice of writing some effective lines of 
code that work. Again, ‘saying it don’t make it so’.
the present article endeavors to place the saying in a wider 
context, where the force of words is put into perspective by referring to 
various contexts: sacral, secular collaborative, familial supportive, and 
not least legal in all senses of the term. It will be shown that indeed, 
‘saying’ things may make a difference — in many cases the difference 
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that makes a difference, sometimes of life and death; a difference that 
is of importance not only for those who hear, but also those who say 
the words, as is especially obvious when it comes to consider the legal 
implications of one’s use of language. Here, I am not only thinking 
of words used in the courts, at the police station, during the hearings 
prior to confirmation of an official’s appointment, but also of the 
language being employed in the private sphere of the testimony, the 
mediation, the contractual situation, and so on. 
More generally, the notion that one’s words have consequences 
not just for the here and now, but also in a wider, global context of 
legal interpretation and in future, not yet realized scenarios, has been a 
familiar one ever since the days of the Babylonian code of Hammurabi, 
the Greek Sophists, and the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition of the 
Bible, talmud and Qur’an. As St. Matthew has it, “everything that man 
shall say, they shall give an account thereof in the day of judgment; for 
by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be 
condemned” (MAttH. 12, vers. 36-37).
2. Questioning the wisdom of the saying: Speech  acts 
and the law
On closer looks, however, the adage ‘Saying it don’t make it so’ 
loses much of its credibility. In effect, there are many ‘sayings’ that 
do ‘make it so’: they ‘do’ something to the sayer and the listener(s): 
addressee(s), overhearers, and bystanders, and to the world around 
them. In the following, I will consider several cases in point, chiefly 
from the world of legal obligations, their transgressions and possible 
ensuing sanctions.
2.1 Speech acts and their effects: General
It is commonly recognized that speech acts, however one 
prefers to classify or subdivide them, all have this in common that 
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they ‘act’: in the German linguist Philipp Wegener’s words, we are 
looking at a linguistic activity (sprachliches Handeln) that consciously 
and effectively wants to make an impression on the ‘actees’ and their 
environment (Wegener 1921). In saying this, Wegener anticipated 
the development of speech act theory by several decades; in the end, 
it was a philosopher, John Austin, who coined the immortal phrase 
‘doing things with words’ (1962) which became the take-off point for 
the trends in philosophy and linguistics that culminated in the late 
nineteen eighties, when ‘pragmatics’ was introduced as a member 
in good standing of the linguistic dynasty of ‘syntax, semantics, and 
pragmatics’ (a division adapted from earlier work by the philosopher 
Charles Morris, working in the Peircean tradition; 1938).
take the simple speech act of ‘promising’. By uttering the words 
‘I promise’ (or performing an act of the same quality as that of the 
‘canonical’ expression to promise), I create a bond, an obligation, on 
myself as utterer to perform the content of the promise. Moreover, the 
promissee, by accepting the promise, is bound to recognizes this bond 
and act accordingly.
2.2 Speech acts and their effects: Legal
But there is more. Wegener talked about the ‘environment’ that 
is subject to the effects of the acting. In the case of the promise, we 
have instances where society visibly and openly ‘interferes’ by ratifying 
the act, and making it into a legal obligation. Some of us may be old 
enough to remember the classical cases of ‘broken promises’, often 
exploited in lightweight early twentieth century novels: a chorus girl 
or some other female from the vida could successfully sue a lord or 
other dignitary from whom she, following a short time liaison, had 
extracted a promise to marry. Breaking his promise would have serious 
consequences for the promiser, so in most cases the matter was settled 
out of court, mediating a handsome compensation to the promissee. 
However, with changing societal mores and in an ever more democratic 
society, the ‘interference’ stopped, and most of the attempted cases 
never made it to, or were thrown out by, the courts.
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2.3 Speech acts and their effects: Institutional. Some cases
In the case of institutionalized promises, such as those 
encountered in marriage in many cultures and religions, a further 
legal dimension comes into play: that of the official representative of 
the society, or particular segment of society, that administrates social 
contracts such as marriage (with the ensuing obligations of moral and 
material nature, such as the proprietorship of goods, the assignment of 
right of succession, and so on). Sometimes, such acts take on rather 
derisory forms, such as when people sell rights and privileges to goods 
and positions that are not even theirs (or do not even exist officially, 
like ‘rights’ on lunar property).  
2.3.1 A case from history
Here is an example from medieval history. On 18 March, 1277, 
a certain Princess Maria of Antioch,  ‘sold’ her chartered rights as 
Queen of Jerusalem to a competing pretender, King Hugh of Cyprus, 
for four thousand pounds of gold and an annuity of four thousand 
pounds tournois.2 the pretenders’ rights were based on intricate 
patterns of inheritance (respectively, being a niece once removed of 
the grandmother of the former Queen versus being an grandson of a 
half-sister to the Queen) and to energetic politicking on both sides; 
and even though the crusader-founded Jerusalem Kingdom by the 
time of the deal had been reduced to a few scores of coastal miles 
along the Mediterranean, and no recent sovereign or pretender ever 
had set foot in his or her property, the Princess’s activity of resignation 
effected a change in the environment: now the successful pretender 
2.  the tours pound, or livre tournois, was a medieval coin and accounting unit worth 
6 écus. As unit of accounting, it was in use as late as during the 19th century (for 
instance, in 1803, the cost of the Louisiana purchase by the USA was specified 
both in dollars, francs, and pounds tournois. (Source: Wikipedia). 
 At the time of the Princess’ resignation, a tours pound was worth about one eighth 
of a gold florin, or of a pound sterling. the ‘4,000 pounds of gold’ that were 
stipulated must have been in actual weight, at the time around 450-455 modern 
grams, as still is the case for today’s weight unit, the US and British pound.
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was free to use the rights to the Kingdom as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations with other nobles and potentates of the period, such as 
the ambitious  Charles of Anjou, who dreamt of establishing a grand 
fiefdom all across the southern Mediterranean (Source: RUNCIMAN 
1958, p.188-189).
2.3.2 Marriage and more
Closer to home, the current marriage ceremonies in the Christian 
churches usually require the presence of an official representative, a 
priest or minister, who not just is witness to the act (there are separate 
charges for that), but the one who effectively ‘performs’ the marrying 
act by pronouncing words to that effect (such as Ego vos conjungo in 
matrimonio in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti ‘I hereby join you 
in matrimony in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost’; 
from the Roman Catholic marriage ritual). Here, the priest’s ’saying’ 
certainly, within the confines of the religious environment, ‘makes 
it so’, that is, it makes the marriage happen, as well as providing it 
with legal validity in those countries where the marriage in the church 
still is recognized as a contract in the context of secular law (e.g. the 
Scandinavian countries, or most of the Catholic countries of Central 
and Southern Europe).
2.3.4 Speech acts and their effects: Religious
to stay in the sphere of performance, doing miracles by uttering 
specific words, undoubtedly belongs here as well. Innumerous are 
the cases where saints and other godly persons have changed the 
environment by ‘saying’ something: Joshua commanding the sun 
to stand still at Gibeon, the moon in the valley of Ayalon (Joshua 
10:12), Jesus telling the lame man to pick up his bed and walk (Mark 
2:9), Jesus changing water into wine at the Cana wedding (John 2:1-
11), or making the deaf and dumb man hear and speak (Mark 7:34), 
where in the latter case even the exact wording of the speech act has 
17
P. 11-27    Jacob L. Mey
been recorded (in Aramaic: Effata, ‘Open up’), and so on; and even 
if some may remain skeptical as to their real content, the Biblical 
stories show a correct understanding of the ‘power of words’, as 
manifested to the faithful present at the time, who appropriately 
exclaimed: “What kind of speech [read: speech acting] is this?” 
(LUKE 4:36).
3. Words, the law, and beyond
So far, the emphasis has been on the actual wording of the 
speech acts; we have not paid much attention to the physical and 
other acts accompanying the words. yet, in many instances this 
aspect of our social/communicative activities needs to be brought 
out into the open, since it often in parasitical ways substitutes for, 
and subsumes the act. the interest that these ‘pseudo-acts’ generate 
is not just academic: there is a whole territory of legal ‘no-man’s 
land’ where acts such as opening an envelope, breaking the seal on a 
package of software, pretend to be legally valid acts that commit the 
actor to certain responsibilities. 
3.1 the internet
How to judge, for instance, the wording that one routinely 
encounters when ordering some goods via the internet: ‘By pressing 
the button “Buy now” you agree to all the conditions and restrictions 
specified in the sales offer’? Sometimes a special ‘understand’ button 
has to be pressed prior to the sale; here one is admonished to act only 
after having read the sales conditions and understood them. In all 
these cases, a contract is entered into without the usual safeguards, 
hedges and negotiation possibilities; while some countries, such as 
Norway and Denmark, have a general ‘opt-out’ period of two months 
for this kind of ‘contracts’, in specific cases the seller may bind the 
buyer/button presser by stating that the goods offered only can be 
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taken back within a very short span of time (e.g. at most 24 hours in 
the case of internet ticket sales by the Danish State Railways). the 
buyer’s options in these transactions are usually extremely limited, 
and even if reading the ‘fine print’ may help one’s understanding, the 
whole process is a one-way street: ‘If you don’t like my conditions, 
then there is no deal’ (a variant of ‘if you don’t like the smoke, stay 
out of the kitchen’).
As I said earlier, the whole territory of internet interactions is 
still largely uncharted as to its legal implications, but the tendency 
seems clear: it’s a seller’s market, the service providers have all 
the power, and for the consumer it’s a lose/lose proposition. 
the pragmatic acts of buying and selling bypass and void any of 
the conditions formulated for ‘regular’ speech acts, and the user 
perspective is virtually absent.
3.2 Reading and other contracts
Elsewhere, I have raised the question whether reading can be 
considered a ‘pragmatic act’ (Mey 2000; cf. also Iser’s ‘act of reading’, 
1980). there, I argued that opening a novel or a collection of poems is 
tantamount to entering into a contract with the author, who introduces 
one into his or her particular ‘poetic space’. In the same way, one 
could maintain, the act of breaking the seal on a package amounts 
to entering into a contract with the seller. the difference, however, 
is that in the latter case, the element of ‘free will’ is totally absent: 
the transaction takes place entirely one the one party’s premises, and 
the only option valid is the one of ‘take it or leave it’. Moreover, the 
user’s reading of the contract (which most people who order stuff on 
the internet presumably do not do) is for a one-time interaction only, 
as it has to do with the transaction in question to the exclusion of 
everything else; no relationship is being built, nor is a commonality 
of interest developed beyond the punctual fact of ‘agreeing to buy on 
seller’s terms’.
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3.2.1 A historical case of ‘reading and understanding’: the 
requerimiento
As to reading itself, it too has a volitional aspect: the Augustinian 
phrase tolle lege (‘pick it up and read’, spoken to the saint and referring 
to the bible in front of him, which he is said to have opened at random 
at Romans 13:13,3 thereby triggering his conversion) would have been 
void and without effect if the hearer had not had the will to read, and 
to perform in accordance with the words perused. However, forcing 
people to read a document does not enable to understand and grasp 
its implications, and thus make them legally bound by its content. 
Specifically, in the case of an illiterate audience, when the reading is 
done by someone else, the creation of a binding obligation arising from 
the text-as-read remains highly problematic. 
As a case in point, consider the requerimiento, a document 
drawn up by the Dominicans at the Spanish court in 1514, and meant 
to assist the conquistadores of the newly discovered American lands 
in their work of ‘pacification’ and Christianization. In essence, the 
document states that God has made the Pope his representative on 
earth, and that His Holiness had given the Spanish King the right 
and duty to conquer their newly-acquired territory and subjugate its 
inhabitants in order to make them obedient to the Holy See and the 
Spanish Crown, for as good Christians, to be rewarded with the hopes 
of eternal salvation. the people whose lands the Spanish had invaded 
were given the choice of subduing themselves to the Spanish Crown, 
or being deprived of all their human rights, and basically reduced to 
slaves or chattel. Although the requerimiento explicitly states that “we 
will not force you to become Christians”, the subtext (and even some 
of the clear text) stipulates all kinds of punishments for those who do 
not let themselves be “received” under the “yoke and obedience to 
the Church and His Majesty” (ZAVALA 2001, quoted BLOCKMANS 
200, p. 106-107). 
3.  “Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and 
envying, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh to fulfill 
the lusts thereof”— hence quite the opposite of St Augustine’s lifestyle until then…
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As the naked facts of history teach us, however, the true 
in- and content of the requerimiento as well as its (ab)use by the 
colonizers became abundantly clear on November 16 of 1532, when 
Francisco Pizarro, having had the document read by the Spanish 
friar Vicente de Valverde before the 5,000 inhabitants of Cajamarca, 
Peru, in the presence of the Inca Atahualpa, had them all massacred 
and the Inca taken prisoner, because neither the natives nor their 
sovereign did manifest any wish to be ‘received’ or ‘saved’. (Source: 
OEStERREICHER, 1999).
3.2.2 the pragmatics of contracts
What the case of the requerimiento shows us, in the legal context 
of a contract that has not been sufficiently explained and discussed, is 
mainly this: 
Pragmatically, a contract is a relationship between users. If 
for some reason, one user is not equipped to deal with the terms of 
the contract, or even understand them properly, the contract can 
never be legally valid (take the case of people who are declared non 
compotes mentis, or who are under age). But how about people who 
willingly ‘press the button’, having been informed that this equals an 
act of acceptance? I would argue that as long as there is no way to 
escape the contract conditions (no matter what the button ‘says’), 
there is no legal binding contract, and the validity of the agreement 
is doubtful. 
the cases of ‘breaking the seal’, ‘pressing the button’ and so on 
that were mentioned earlier, are all actions taking place in what could 
be called a ‘situation of no return’, comparable to one where a promise 
is given under duress. the force of the written words by themselves 
can never aspire to equal the obligation that arises from a contract that 
is entered upon freely and without encumbrances or ‘killer clauses’ of 
the type ‘Whoever reads this is crazy’—like the graffiti that we used to 
scrawl on walls and fences when we were young.
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4. Contextual (consensual) acts
the patres conscripti, members of the Roman Senate, had their 
own way of voting on proposed laws and ordinances: they would ‘vote 
with their feet’. By moving to the one or the other side of the Senate 
Hall in the Capitol they would signify their agreement with, respectively 
objection to, the proposed measures. this ‘voting movement’ was 
called pedibus ire in sententiam, literally ‘using one’s feet to manifest 
one’s vote’. the idea that moving one’s body may be taken as a sign of 
assent or dissent is of course not restricted to the ancient Romans; we 
all use our heads every day to manifest our adhering to, or dissenting 
from, what has been said. true, the actual realization of the move may 
differ, such that a modern Greek person’s downward head move has 
to be taken to mean his/her assent (as opposed to an upward move for 
dissent), while the left-to-right, right-to-left head shake, common in 
Western European culture as a means of manifesting dissent, is absent 
in Greek; all of which is apt to cause a good deal of misunderstanding 
for Westerners, when confronted with the Greek practice. Note, too, 
that the Greek head moving custom predates contemporary touristic 
difficulties by several millennia: compare that the Romans used the 
linguistic distinction involved in the moves of ad-/an- vs. ab-nuo 
(‘moving one’s head to’, respectively ‘away from’ the addressee) in 
exactly the same way, and they manifested it physically by moving their 
heads in what we now see as a typically ‘Greek’ fashion.4 
From the same sphere of classic civilization, we retain even 
today the expressions ‘thumbs up’ vs. ‘thumbs down’ (to manifest 
approval or disapproval), in analogy to what the Romans used to 
do when confronted with the question whether or not to spare the 
life of a defeated gladiator in the favorite reality sports of the day, 
euphemistically called the ludi circenses, ‘circus games’ (the circus, at 
Rome represented by the Coliseum, functioned in many ways as the 
Plazas de toros or the football fields in certain contemporary societies).
4.  Compare the inscription on the Grand Seal of the USA: “[Deus] Annuit Coeptis”, 
‘[God] has approved of what was started’.
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5. Legal (Speech?) Acts
What all these cases show is that ‘saying’ not always or 
necessarily implies using one’s voice (or writing). Legally, a pragmatic 
act such as moving one’s hands at an auction or in the context of a 
gladiatorial session may have the effect of a speech act, well and 
properly executed, on one condition: that the context is such that 
the act is executed and recognized in accordance with the societal 
conventions. thus, the ‘show of hands’, often practiced at meetings 
in the Anglophone world to see if there is a majority to second a 
proposed motion, may be recognized as legal only if no one protests 
(actually, the practice can always be questioned by anybody who 
feels uncertain about the correct count). Consequently, the ‘show of 
hands’ and other, similar practices are never the last ‘words’ in these 
particular contexts. 
Which brings us back to the validity of the earlier mentioned 
acts such as ‘pressing a button’ or ‘breaking a seal’. Here, too, the 
context decides on the legality and/or validity of the action; moreover, 
in a given contextual setting, even barely perceptible, minute motions 
of the head or fingers (or even the eyebrows) may give rise, within 
the particular context, to a settlement of contracts. (Compare that 
teachers of courses such as Citizenship 301, when chaperoning their 
freshman students to manifestations of social life like public fish or 
antique auctions, have to admonish the inexperienced audience to 
keep perfectly still during the entire session, and not move a single 
limb or utter a single word, because indeed ‘whatever is said may be 
counted in your (dis)favor’). 
6. Normative conventions, contexts, and legality
Elsewhere (Mey 2000), I have considered the normative aspects 
of contextuality: how, by entering a well-defined ‘space’ (such as the 
literary universe created by an author), one voluntarily submits oneself 
to the norms and rules that are current in that space. One’s acceptance 
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of the societal norms is particularly relevant in our case, where acts 
of the kind that I referred to above, only can be properly understood, 
evaluated, and honored when they are put in relation to their contexts. 
the ‘normative’ aspect of that context is intimately related to the 
society in which the norms have been formed; sometimes, however, 
or even much of the time, those norms are kept ‘under cover’, so to 
speak, to be trotted  out only in case of necessity, not seldom to the 
surprise of the people who are being ‘normed’.
6.1 An Israeli case
the Israeli scholar Sol Azuelos-Atias, in her work on the 
norms and conventions surrounding Israeli jurisprudence, has 
painted a rather disturbing picture of the way justice is administered 
vis-à-vis certain of the original inhabitants of Palestine. there are a 
great many ‘contextual’, but rather vague, notions around in the legal 
discourse of the State of Israel; among the most controversial ones 
are those like ‘the ordinary Israeli’ (ha-yisraeli ha-memuca), or ‘the 
reasonable Israeli person’ (ha-adam ha-savir ha-yisraeli), a mythical 
beast supposed to represent the norm for conduct and behavior of 
all Israeli citizens (Azuelos-Atias 2007: 51). the notion does not 
take into account the fact that there are many Israeli citizens who do 
not follow the ‘norm’: for one thing, they don’t speak or understand 
Hebrew (their mother tongue is Arabic), and thus are not able to 
follow juridical discourse in the former language.5 In the courts, the 
notion is used to discriminate againjst people who do not understand 
the language of the procedures (Hebrew); and even if one translates 
concepts such as ‘ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ into Arabic, it is still the 
Israeli norm or ‘being ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ that is decisive. this 
holds even for such mundane cases as how to handle notions of time 
and space, which may be quite different in the two languages and 
cultures, Hebrew and Arabic; e.g. does the preposition ‘over’ in a 
5. I am not even talking here about the one million Russian immigrants, whose 
Hebrew is quite shaky, to say the least.
24
Cadernos de Linguagem e Sociedade, 14 (2), 2013
spatial context include the terminus ad quem? Is “over him” the same 
as, or different from, “facing him” in Arabic vs. Hebrew—a crucial 
distinction in an actual court case discussed by the author; Azuelos-
Atias 2007: 130?)
6.2 Future legal acts and sequentiality: A pragmatic angle
In pragmatic thinking, the user is paramount. that means that 
all acts of speaking have to be related to the user—not just the speaker, 
but including the hearer(s), possible bystanders and overhearers 
(ratified or not), and in the end even hearers who are not yet ‘there’ 
in time and space: the future generations. to take an obvious example 
(due to my colleague Uwe Kjær Nissen in personal communication), a 
person writing his of her last will and testament envisions the recipient 
of the message as being potentially far away in the future (of course 
depending on the point of time of writing the will). the pragmatic act of 
making a will takes necessarily the time dimension into consideration, 
both as regards the ‘speaker’ (“My last will and testament”) and the 
‘destinees’ (to be identified in the succession of time, at the moment of 
opening the testament). Clearly, the act of making a testament would 
lack sense if one did not take these temporal, spatial, and personal 
dimensions into account. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Mey 2013), what has been 
called ‘sequentiality’ in Conversation Analysis has a great impact 
also for speech act theorizing. For instance, what can be proposed 
and discussed in speech act theory as a simple case of ‘promising’, 
becomes immensely complicated once one counts in the dimensions 
mentioned above; and while it is true that no speech act comes into 
its own, unless acknowledged by the receiver (an insight already 
familiar to classical speech act theory), one must go further and say 
that speech acts, to be evaluated properly as pragmatic acts (see Mey 
2001: ch. 8), have to be situated in light of what follows, not just of 
what precedes. 
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6.3 Sequential apology
thus, an act of apologizing, taken by itself, is just that; but 
placed in the context of a (semi-)official situation such as the court 
room, or visiting a public place like a museum, the apology issued by 
an official representative of the institution in question may amount to 
a warning, or even a (negative) injunction, as the following example 
(adapted from Haugh 2007: 86) shows: 
[A visitor to the Edo-tokyo Museum is sitting down on a bench, 
starting to unwrap a package of food. A museum attendant, upon 
seeing this, approaches the visitor and says):
(Attendant) Mooshiwake gozaimasen ...  mooshiwake gozaimasen 
...
(‘I’m very sorry ... I’m very sorry ...’)
(Visitor) A, ikenai?
(‘Oh, it’s not allowed?’)
(Attendant) Mooshiwake gozaimasen ...   
Notice here that the Japanese expression Mooshiwake gozaimasen 
(‘I’m very sorry’) has nothing to do with the actual situation as such; 
it is a very general, very polite way of saying ‘Sorry’. No mention is 
made of regulations, prohibitions, propriety, food & drink; no appeal 
is made to authority, visitor behavior, sanctions, and the like. yet, 
this apology, in function of its character as an ‘indirect speech act’ of 
admonishing/reminding/prohibiting and so on, is immediately taken 
up by the visitor, who interprets the situated utterance of ‘apologizing’ 
as a pragmatic act of ‘not allowing’.
Accepting the sequentiality of our acting (Mey 2013) is thus a 
natural consequence of admitting the societal, legal dimension into 
our thinking about speech acts. Humans evolve over time, and so does 
their use of language—not just seen as a static, ‘instant’ picture of 
what is actually being said (as Saussure seemed to believe), but as a 
perspective on what the things said mean, and may come to mean, in the 
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wider context of space and time. this ‘opening up’ of the hermetically 
closed speech act context is in my opinion one of the most valuable 
aspects of pragmatic thinking: it guarantees that we are not ‘beating 
the thin air’ of linguistic abstraction by constructing decontextualized 
phrases, but are taking up the challenge of speaking to, acting on, the 
world, and by doing so, change it. 
Conclusion: A legal difference
In effect, only in the sense defined here (and emphatically so), 
‘saying something’ makes a difference. Wittgenstein used to claim that 
uttering a true sentence changes the world. Hence, ‘saying it don’t 
make it so’ is only true under certain, narrowly defined conditions, 
valid for specific situations (such as developing a computer program 
internally). In a wider contextual (specifically, legal) environment, 
‘saying it’ does make something happen — and the effect of one’s 
speech is mostly irreversible, as it has changed the world in some 
respects. In other words, what we need is to recognize and highlight 
the inevitable volitional orientation of our speech acting that seems to 
have lacked in discussions on how to ‘do things with words’. (Re-) 
introducing this orientation (among other things, in the guise of the 
‘pragmatic act’, as I have suggested elsewhere; Mey 2001) may result 
in a more fruitful treatment of speech acting, by alerting users to the 
implications of their acts in space and time. 
‘Nobody is an island’, it has been said, meaning that nobody 
can pretend to live in ‘splendid isolation’, each in his or her little 
closed environment. the corollary is that our words, once spoken, 
will cross mountains, rivers, oceans and other boundaries to revert to 
their original utterers in forms they perhaps did not anticipate, but are 
bound to live with, and accept, as authentic, binding interpretations.
Recebido em: agosto de 2013
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